Junior ROTC Has Been a Lasting Program

Soldiers in the Schoolhouse: A Military History of the Junior ROTC. Arthur T. Coumbe. University Press of Kentucky (An AUSA Title). 336 pages. $60 hardcover, $30 softcover

By Brig. Gen. John Brown, U.S. Army retired

The Junior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps has been one of the United States armed forces’ largest and most lasting domestic engagement programs. Focused on high school students, it is a federal program to enhance citizenship, discipline, leadership, responsibility and service to the nation. In 2024, it encompassed almost 540,000 cadets in about 3,500 units.

Since its inception with the National Defense Act of 1916, the Junior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (JROTC) has shaped the lives of millions. Despite its salience as a defense effort, no book-length account has addressed the history of the program—until now.

In Soldiers in the Schoolhouse: A Military History of the Junior ROTC, Arthur Coumbe takes on this under-told story. Coumbe is ideally suited to author this study. Having served for 30 years as a military intelligence officer, he also served almost 20 years as the historian for the U.S. Army Cadet Command. Seasoned by years of teaching, and authoring numerous publications, he now serves in the Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York.

After a chapter discussing antecedents to the program, dating back through colonial times, Coumbe develops his subject in 10 chronological chapters. Each chapter, covering a timespan of two to 18 years, addresses an era or pivot point in the JROTC experience. Robustly documented, the book has 48 pages of endnotes. An index enables a speedy focus on topics of interest. Appendices depict enrollments and numbers of units over the years.

Coumbe’s thoughtful narrative provides a detailed historical account and is particularly good at flagging recurrent issues debated time and again. Should the program focus more on developing character or encouraging recruitment? What is the best balance between resourcing JROTC and senior ROTC, the college-level equivalent, given different end states and demographic appeal? Is it enough to have programs where locals are the most receptive, or should the program be offered everywhere? How does academic credit compare to exposure to military practices and culture as a priority? How many active-duty service members should be committed, and in what ranks?

The value of JROTC has been perhaps most powerfully evoked in firestorms that have erupted during the occasional efforts to dismantle it. Critics are not just pacifists or those suspicious of the military’s footprint in society but also cost-cutters eager to trim government spending. In a chapter worth the cost of the book, Coumbe describes former Secretary of

Defense Robert McNamara’s abortive 1963 effort to end JROTC. Congressional supporters of JROTC pushed back with passionate arguments on behalf of the students, their communities, the armed services and the nation. In a microcosm, this chapter captures all that matters most in the support of JROTC. I strongly recommend Soldiers in the Schoolhouse to all who are interested in the intersections among military service, education, community outreach, citizenship development and recruitment. It also should be required reading for any who become involved with the ROTC. There is finally a comprehensive yet accessible history of this critical program.

Brig. Gen. John Brown, U.S. Army retired, served 33 years in the Army, with his last assignment as chief of military history at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. The author of Kevlar Legions: The Transformation of the United States Army, 1989–2005, he holds a doctorate in history from Indiana University.

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Author Highlights Unit’s Role in Afghanistan

Sons of the Arghandab: Top Guns in the Devil’s Playground. Joseph J. Fontenot. Casemate. 272 pages. $34.95

By Command Sgt. Maj. Scott Schroeder, U.S. Army retired

Sons of the Arghandab: Top Guns in the Devil’s Playground, by Joseph Fontenot, is a compelling work written from the perspective of young leaders who have the wisdom and maturity of more senior and seasoned combat veterans.

This is the story of front-line soldiers from 1st Battalion, 320th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), as they fought in the Arghandab River Valley of Afghanistan. The soldiers of the “Top Guns” battalion deployed and operated in the heart of a Taliban area previously considered a no-go zone for coalition forces. They took the fight to the enemy in what became one of the most difficult and bloody campaigns for the 101st Airborne in the post-9/11 era. They were key to the brigade earning a Presidential Unit Citation during this deployment.

This unit of artillerymen was trained and transformed into an infantry unit that would face the formidable challenges of combat in the harshest of environments against a relentless enemy from 2010 to 2011 during the U.S. surge of units and troops in Afghanistan.

The book is filled with detailed descriptions of tactical engagements, allowing the reader to feel the fatigue, fear, heat, concussive blasts and confusion of battle. This story also allows the reader to understand the intellect, adaptability and compassion of America’s finest.

I was reminded of the incredible courage soldiers demonstrate and what they will do for their country, and are willing to endure for their unit and sacrifice for one another. Not just for a day, but day after day for weeks and months.

Fontenot pulls the curtain back a little, allowing readers to learn personal stories and experience the spartan living conditions and life of soldiers on the front line. It is no wonder bonds born in such conditions are so strong.

We also are reminded that the war doesn’t end on the battlefield, and that some of the most difficult fights come after the war. Readers will be jolted by a sobering reminder that with any conflict, there are stolen lives on both sides of the battlefield. Many soldiers lost limbs, and all experienced the emotional scars born in combat. They always will carry a painful reminder of the loss of their brothers and sisters. Those young men and women forever will be changed by the theft of their youth and innocence. The author candidly shares his own struggles with post-traumatic stress, offering a personal perspective on the importance of seeking help.

Through the eyes of young leaders and seasoned veterans, readers can see the courage and camaraderie that endure beyond the battlefield. I am proud of this unit and these soldiers, not because they were my soldiers, but because they did what was asked of them, they won the fight, and they loved each other. Sons of the Arghandab not only highlights the physical and emotional toll of combat but also underscores the ongoing need for understanding and support for veterans.

Command Sgt. Maj. Scott Schroeder, U.S. Army retired, is the managing member of The Proximity Group and an AUSA Leadership Education Fellow. He was the command sergeant major of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) from 2010 to 2012, retiring as the command sergeant major of U.S. Army Forces Command.

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Three Generals Left Mark On Army Air Operations

The Airborne Mafia: The Paratroopers Who Shaped America’s Cold War Army. Robert F. Williams. Cornell University Press. 288 pages. $29.95

By Col. Cole Kingseed, U.S. Army retired

Key leaders from airborne units controlled the institutional direction of the Army in the turbulent decade of the 1950s. Led by Gen. Matthew Ridgway, Gen. Maxwell Taylor and Lt. Gen. James Gavin, the “airborne mafia” ushered in “organizational changes centered on decentralization and mobility, helicopter-borne airmobile tactics, and a strategic response force that provided the army with a rapidly deployable force projection capability from within the United States.”

In The Airborne Mafia: The Paratroopers Who Shaped America’s Cold War Army, former paratrooper Robert Williams offers a fresh analysis of how this transformation occurred. Williams uses the term “mafia” cautiously, noting that the “airborne club” refers to a group of like-minded people who shared a similar background and who assisted and protected one another, sometimes to the disadvantage of other groups. A combat veteran of Iraq and Afghanistan, Williams is a historian with Army University Press and U.S. Army Combined Arms Command at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 

Williams introduces his narrative with an explanation of the airborne’s cultural origins rooted in the World War II experience that emphasized an attitude of exceptionalism, unit pride, flexibility and innovative thinking. Paratroopers became the Army’s poster children as soon as they were prominently featured in Life magazine in 1940. Though paratroopers distinguished themselves in the Pacific theater, commanders from Europe and the Mediterranean—most notably the triumvirate of Ridgway, Taylor and Gavin—emerged from the war in resplendent glory.

To his credit, Williams notes that these leaders and their acolytes frequently held divergent views about the Army’s direction. As Army chiefs of staff, Ridgway and Taylor frequently voiced strong opposition to President Dwight Eisenhower’s administration on budgetary allocations and interservice rivalries. The relationship between Taylor and Gavin, who was Taylor’s deputy chief of staff for research and development, increasingly deteriorated during the 1950s as Gavin allegedly considered his boss less than forthright.

Perhaps the most provocative chapter of Williams’ analysis is his description of the airborne influence on atomic warfare. During the immediate postwar decade, the Army experimented with structural changes, including an Atomic Field Army, or ATFA-1: a division that contained seven infantry battalions alongside tank, engineer and other support elements. Later, the Army fielded a Pentomic Division that called for air-transportable divisions based on five self-sufficient battle groups.

Williams attributes the failure of this reorientation of the Army for atomic warfare to a variety of factors. The doctrine for atomic warfare was never officially written, and the equipment did not match the needs of the Pentomic Division. Moreover, each experimental organization remained cumbersome despite its smaller numbers. Despite these failures, atomic reorientation was successful in keeping the Army relevant throughout the decade as Eisenhower shifted his attention from a large ground force to a strategy of massive retaliation, where the Air Force commanded more fiscal resources.

By late 1959, the airborne mafia—Ridgway, Taylor and Gavin—had all retired. However, their influence on the Army of the 21st century remains a powerful force. Reflecting on the airborne mafia’s legacy, Williams boldly states that by “institutionalizing a way of thinking that emphasized air-mindedness and sense of immediate response,” airborne culture has become Army culture. Not only is The Airborne Mafia a well-told story, but it also deserves wide circulation throughout the current force. 

Col. Cole Kingseed, U.S. Army retired, a former professor of history at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York, is a writer and consultant. He holds a doctorate in history from The Ohio State University.

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Revisiting America’s Failed Interventions

Outmaneuvered: America’s Tragic Encounter with Warfare from Vietnam to Afghanistan. James A. Warren. Scribner. 336 pages. $29.99

By Lt. Col. Gregory Banner, U.S. Army retired

Professional soldiers and national politicians should recognize the reality of the U.S. experience fighting unconventional conflicts over the past 60 years. The track record has not been good. Given the repeated failures, one would think learning from those failures would be a national and professional priority.

James Warren, in his book Outmaneuvered: America’s Tragic Encounter with Warfare from Vietnam to Afghanistan, has tried to summarize this history from Vietnam to Afghanistan. His thesis is that America’s problems across these multiple wars have been a “pervasive strategic ineptitude at the pinnacle of Washington’s national security bureaucracy.” Further, he states that the foreign policy community often has pushed for military solutions to complicated internal political and social conflicts in other countries. He includes in the problem the top personnel in the Pentagon. His assertion is that military leadership in Washington has either been equally incompetent or unwilling to push back in any meaningful way against civilian mismanagement and errors.

Warren is a military historian, author and policy analyst. His book provides a summary of these past 60 years and the major dynamics surrounding our entry and prosecution of multiple conflicts. He analyzes wars such as Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, but also devotes time to smaller involvements like Lebanon and Somalia. Space also is devoted to other major issues, such as the broad struggle against Islamic militancy, Iran and the global war on terror. He looks at each one chronologically, trying to identify our major choices and often the thinking of key individuals in government, including military leadership. He spends time describing America’s enemies and why they often came out on top. One gap is that he unfortunately does not spend any effort looking at American successes. It would balance the story if he acknowledged that occasionally U.S. efforts turn out well. 

The usual mantra is that the Pentagon executes but does not set policy. Nevertheless, if policy is weak or misguided, that can leave the department with a poor hand to play. It, therefore, is in the War Department’s, and often most directly the Army’s, interest to be aggressively involved in decisions about how the armed forces should be used. Understanding these higher national systems and the history of how these systems have impacted warfighters is critical and a useful purpose served by this book.

The subtitle of Outmaneuvered is “America’s Tragic Encounter with Warfare from Vietnam to Afghanistan.” For anyone looking for a broad education in this history, this is a useful synopsis of America’s recent past and misadventures. While Warren only offers the history—not recommendations for solutions—it is still a great starting point for political as well as military leaders. The challenges remain and always will be a part of our reality as an international leader.  

Lt. Col. Gregory Banner, U.S. Army retired, was an infantry and Special Forces officer with a secondary specialty in civil affairs. He served in three Special Forces groups and served in a variety of special operations assignments, including a combat tour as a district team chief in a military advisory group. He holds two master’s degrees in military history focusing on unconventional warfare.