Can today’s senior leaders learn much from the U.S. Army’s origins 250 years ago? On the surface, one might answer, “Not really.” After all, so much has changed since 1775, and change itself has accelerated at a dizzying pace—especially relative to that of the Revolutionary War era. Today’s leaders might look to the past and see more dissimilarity than similarity compared to the domestic and international environment they face today. A better answer might be: “Take a closer look.”
Look at the ambiguity and complexity Gen. George Washington faced. When he rode toward Boston in 1775 as a newly minted commander in chief, his strategic mission was reconciliation with Great Britain. About a year later, it was independence from Great Britain.
He had no Regular Army; he had to create one as he fought, integrate it with disparate militias (not the other way around) and figure out how to use both to eject the professional, modern and highly capable British Army from the Colonies. He also had to work out how to use the military forces of 13 Colonies—each considering itself more sovereign than united, and each with its own recruiting, payment, terms of enlistment and sustainment methods—again, as he fought.
And, he had to work with a less-than-empowered Congress that was still developing the processes and organizations necessary to govern an emerging nation as well as directing the war effort. In sum, Washington had to manage a coalition of near-sovereign Colonies-not-quite-states and an alliance, and do it all while fighting and being properly subordinate to a sometimes dysfunctional Congress.
Superpowers at War
But there’s more. Washington fought America’s War of Independence within a turbulent geostrategic environment. Two superpowers, France and Great Britain, had been at it since kicking off the French and Indian War in North America in 1754.
Their great-power competition ignited over a dispute of the Ohio territory—the area along the Great Lakes, including the forks of the Ohio River and the Ohio Valley. Britain won, but that victory set the seeds not only for trouble with its American Colonies, but also for French assistance to the Americans seeking independence from England. For the French, American independence was less important than cutting Britain down a notch while maintaining control of the colonies they had left in the Western Hemisphere.
Looking at it this way, the answer of “take a closer look” makes more sense.
Following are four problems Washington and today’s senior leaders share:
1. The Army is too small. Washington had to convince both the Continental Congress and the state legislatures to authorize a Regular Army, appropriate the funds necessary to create and sustain it, and continue to support the states’ militias as well. In many cases, he also had to convince those bodies to extend enlistment contracts—just so he had an Army to use.
Today’s Army is facing an expansibility problem. Simply put, it’s too small given the global security environment. The sad reality—one Washington would recognize—is that growing the Army in today’s budget setting is difficult. However, what is possible is to set conditions so that when expansion occurs, the Army is ready. This means rethinking the roles, missions and relationships among the active Army, Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve.
During the Cold War—when the Army had to be ready to potentially fight a global war—the operational Army had three tiers: units ready to fight immediately, an operational reserve and a strategic reserve. And the institutional Army had a significant force generation capacity. When the Cold War ended, the operational and institutional Army shrank. The operational reserve was strengthened; then it was used, with the active force, often. In fact, there’s evidence that the Army was overused during the post-9/11 wars, causing recruiting, maintenance and equipment problems. During this period, both the strategic reserve and force generation capacity faded away.
Today’s leaders cannot re-create the Cold War Army; that would be a fool’s errand. But they might be able to reimagine roles and missions for the active and reserve components in such a way to better balance meeting today’s requirements while preparing for the next expansibility challenge.
2. The Army needs Congress’ help. While encamped at Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, in the winter of 1777–78, Washington wrote a 38-page letter to Congress’ Camp Committee. It was just one of many he wrote to members of Congress and to state governmental leaders during the war. In it, he was brutally honest about the challenges he and the Army faced, and he recommended solutions. Washington pulled no punches in the letter. He also invited members of Congress to see for themselves both the poor condition of the Army and the measures for improvement he was undertaking. Perhaps more importantly, he used the letter and visits to converse with lawmakers to increase their understanding of the depth of the Army’s problems and the need for war-winning solutions. The exchange of views, in letters and visits, also expanded trust in Washington’s leadership at a critical time.
Today’s senior leaders cannot solve any of the Army’s major challenges by themselves. They need Congress’ support. And that support first requires understanding. As difficult as it is in the current political environment, today’s senior leaders should consider doubling down on congressional engagement. Like Washington, they must pull no punches in describing the problems the Army faces to meet current as well as potential national security challenges, to lay out what the Army is doing within its means and authority to meet those challenges and to identify how Congress can help. Proper subordination to civil authorities requires clear, open and honest communication.
Congressional understanding and support is the result not only of the activities of the Army’s congressional liaison officer and senior leaders, but also of local commanders interacting with members and staff. As things stand, the Army might consider a congressional engagement campaign in the form of a well-structured and well-coordinated “all hands on deck” campaign—inside the Beltway and out. No doubt, Army senior leaders are working with Congress on these kinds of issues. Equally without doubt, however, is that more is better.
3. Winning wars requires allies. Washington was well aware of how much French government financing, troops, sailors, arms, uniforms and gunpowder assisted Colonial forces fighting the British. He was receiving French and Dutch covert aid as early as 1776. After the 1778 French-American alliance, even more aid flowed from Paris: over 1 billion livres, about 12,000 ground troops and over 60 warships—vital to final success at Yorktown, Virginia. The French helped in other ways. The alliance with American rebels provided not only a boost to American morale and capability; it also forced Britain to divert strategic attention and military forces away from the Colonies to counter the French threat. The French alliance also bolstered America’s political viability.
Today, the strength and capability of America’s military might give the impression that should war break out, the U.S. could go it alone. Such a belief is false.
The importance of allies will be evident from the start of almost any war. The U.S. will need basing rights, overflight rights and transportation agreements just to deploy forces overseas. Further, if a war includes multiple theaters, America’s military—whether Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard or Space Force—would prove too small to conduct a global war. Such a situation would require expanding America’s military and incorporating allied intelligence assets; transportation—sea, air and rail; medical facilities, logistics and defense industrial capacity; and a secure, global communications network. In none of these categories is the U.S. self-sufficient, except for limited wars of short duration. These capabilities were stretched thin even in America’s post-9/11 wars.
All the above are clearly known to the Army’s senior leaders but may not be as clear to leaders in the executive or legislative branches—or to the American people. This is another significant communications challenge the Army’s senior leaders face. Repeating that the U.S. Army is the greatest army on the face of the earth is not enough. Army senior leaders must engage with other organizations like the Association of the U.S. Army, associations of other services, veterans’ organizations, academia and think tanks, and other nonmilitary groups to address this communications challenge. Although they cannot act alone, Army leaders play a key role in conceiving and promulgating such an engagement program—within lawful and regulatory limitations.
4. The “soul” of the Army must be preserved. In Washington’s general orders published on Jan. 1, 1776, he wrote that subordination and discipline are “the Life and Soul of an Army.” Washington used “soul” in the classic sense: “soul” as applied to a particular human being or an organization of human beings; “soul” as understood as that which distinguished it from other similar people or organizations. Using this understanding of “soul,” senior Army leaders can ask what the soul of the U.S. Army is today—that is, what distinguishes it from other armies? A possible answer is that the U.S. Army’s training methodology, values and NCO corps set it apart.
The U.S. Army trains differently than most armies. Its focus is on performance-oriented training: Don’t just talk about a task; do it. Its methodology requires leaders to identify a task or set of tasks upon which individuals, leaders or units are to train, then set conditions in which the identified tasks can be performed. Finally, soldiers evaluate execution against a published set of standards. If tasks are performed to standard, training is complete. If not, training continues until the standard is met.
Continuous learning by doing—task, conditions, standards; plan, prepare, execute, assess and redo; all training is evaluated internally or externally, formally or informally; leaders are responsible for the training of their soldiers, subordinate leaders and units. That’s the core of Army training methodology. Straying from this methodology for too long will change the Army.
The second part of the Army’s “soul” is its values: leadership, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity and personal courage—physical and moral. The Army creates trust when each soldier, leader, unit or other organization acts consistently within its stated values. But each time a soldier, leader, unit or organization strays from these values, trust erodes. The longer and more consistently it strays, the greater the erosion and the risk of becoming a different Army increases.
Greatest NCO Corps
The third element of “soul” is the Army’s NCO corps—the greatest NCO corps ever seen, made great because of the responsibility given to NCOs, because of the select-train-promote model of NCO development and because of the outstanding American NCO Education System. Taking the NCO Education System seriously by continually updating it and sending sergeants to school on time (even if it creates short-term pain in units), the Army strengthens this part of its “soul.” So does holding NCO selection boards on time and choosing the right soldiers for promotion. Also, it’s important to give NCOs the responsibility they should have—in garrison as well as in combat. Straying from this approach, over time, will weaken the NCO corps and risk formation of an Army different from what it is.
The question for senior leaders is this: Is this description of the Army’s soul sufficient? The Army Values are a creation of the mid-1990s. Leaders might ask, given the current geostrategic and domestic situations, should we amend or add to these values? The answer may be “no,” but better to ask than to assume.
Two hundred and fifty years is a long time.
Yet in at least these ways, the problems Washington faced during the Army’s creation are reflected in the problems today’s Army faces. As with so many aspects of the military profession, a close study of history exposes both differences and similarities. It also informs contemporary leaders. Washington, a continual learner himself, would be the first to agree: The more things change, the more they are the same.
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Lt. Gen. James Dubik, U.S. Army retired, a former commander of Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, is a senior fellow of the Association of the U.S. Army. He holds a doctorate from Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, and is the author of Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory.