The decline of the U.S. Army’s cavalry force did not occur in one sweeping decision. Rather, it was a slow, incremental process shaped by two decades of institutional drift, doctrinal confusion and well-

intended but ultimately harmful organizational change. It began in the early 2000s as the Army rapidly restructured to meet the demands of the global war on terror.

A critical moment came in 2003, when Army leadership chose to eliminate all air cavalry troops from division and regimental formations. This disbanded the Army’s only true air/ground reconnaissance units—formations that had long combined rotary-wing aircraft and ground scouts into integrated teams capable of deep reconnaissance, screen-and-guard missions and mobile security operations. These air-ground teams represented a doctrinally unique and strategically irreplaceable capability.

As the Army implemented the modular brigade combat team concept, traditional division cavalry squadrons were replaced by reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) squadrons. These new battalion-sized units were doctrinally ill-suited for the reconnaissance and security tasks their predecessors had conducted. Designed for flexibility and counterinsurgency support, RSTA squadrons in Iraq and Afghanistan quickly were absorbed into the general-purpose force pool, frequently tasked with area security and route clearance rather than true reconnaissance.

The loss of the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopter further widened the gap. Air-ground coordination once executed in real time between manned rotary assets and ground elements was replaced by limited unmanned aircraft system (UAS) support from Shadow and Raven platforms. These unmanned systems lacked the survivability, range and human-machine teaming dynamics that characterized traditional cavalry reconnaissance. The merger of infantry and armor schools in the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning, Georgia, is a contributor to the slow erosion of cavalry’s doctrinal clarity, institutional relevance and strategic value.

Operational Blind Spot

Today, the Army faces a critical and expanding reconnaissance gap. The inactivation of all air and light cavalry squadrons has stripped divisions and corps of flexible, echeloned reconnaissance capabilities. The only cavalry units remaining are embedded in armored brigade combat teams, where their roles have narrowed to close-in security and flank protection.

The decision to halt MQ-1C Gray Eagle procurement has further reduced the Army’s capacity for long-range sensing. Gray Eagle was the only division-level UAS capable of operating 200–300 kilometers forward in contested electromagnetic environments. Without it, the Army lacks an organic aerial RSTA platform with endurance, resilience and joint synchronization.

In its place, the Army has emphasized tactical UAS proliferation across company and battalion levels. But real-world evidence—particularly from Ukraine—indicates small drones are vulnerable. Reports show up to 90% attrition within days due to jamming, directed energy, malfunctions, operator inexperience and kinetic strikes. These systems, while valuable in permissive environments, cannot substitute for survivable, networked reconnaissance platforms.

Even if these drones were made more durable, the Army’s logistics structure is not designed to sustain the massive throughput of batteries, replacement parts and software updates required to keep swarms of expendable UASs combat-effective for extended periods. The idea that additive manufacturing or decentralized field repairs can meaningfully offset this logistical burden remains speculative at best. Moreover, even if the Army can overcome the aforementioned challenges, the Army tactical network lacks the bandwidth and resilience needed to support data and connectivity demands of large-scale distributed UAS operations.

The Army has lost its ability to conduct coordinated, multidomain reconnaissance operations at tempo and depth. Without dedicated, well-trained reconnaissance forces operating at echelon, the Army risks relying on reactive targeting and late-stage situational awareness—a recipe for strategic surprise and tactical overmatch.

A New Cavalry Model

If the Army is to regain its edge in reconnaissance and security operations, it must reimagine the cavalry not as a legacy force but as a future enabling formation.

This means developing a modernized, modular cavalry ecosystem centered around manned-

unmanned teaming, distributed sensor networks and survivable combat platforms. At the core of this concept is a Light Assault Tank Ecosystem (LAT-E)—a family of light, air-transportable, networked armored vehicles designed for reconnaissance, mobile security and kill-chain integration.

It also should incorporate these five core imperatives.

Rebuild Air-Ground Reconnaissance Security Teams. Create scalable formations at division and corps levels that integrate an air cavalry- manned airframe, medium-lift UAS and ground scouts into unified air-ground reconnaissance teams. These must be trained, manned and equipped to fight for information in contested airspace and cluttered terrain.

Establish a light cavalry troop for infantry brigade combat teams. Infantry brigades must not be forced to choose between maneuver and awareness. A light cavalry troop equipped with LAT-E vehicles, loitering munitions and counter-UAS packages will provide brigade combat teams with a dedicated, survivable reconnaissance force that can deploy with or ahead of maneuver elements.

Enable reconnaissance/security at echelon. Corps and divisions require formations trained in deep sensing, deception and target development. These cannot be substituted by joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance handoffs or contractor-operated sensors.

Train to fight for information. Reconnaissance must be viewed as a combined-arms fight. Training should incorporate electronic warfare, obscuration, decoys, deception and kinetic disruption of enemy reconnaissance assets.

Modernize doctrine and institutional culture. Reconnaissance and security must be re-elevated as decisive operations. Field Manual 3-98: Reconnaissance and Security Operations, must be revised, professional military education curriculum overhauled and leader development programs realigned to restore an institutional appreciation for the reconnaissance fight.

Adapt regionally to tailor cavalry for theater-specific roles. One size will not fit all. Cavalry formations must be regionally optimized.

In the European theater, future conflict will be defined by maneuver warfare at scale, long-range precision fires, drone-enabled deep sensing and anti-armor saturation. Cavalry formations operating in this battlespace must endure high-intensity, high-lethality engagements while maneuvering across hundreds of kilometers. European-focused cavalry units must integrate the LAT-E as a maneuverable collection and targeting platform—complemented by heavier, survivable vehicles capable of gun tube-to-gun tube engagements. These formations act as multidomain hubs, linking sensing assets to long-range precision shooters, enabling deep targeting at the corps and theater levels. They must operate with resilience against electronic warfare, loitering munitions and armored counterattack while supporting long-range fires and denying enemy reconnaissance. Survivability, deep sensing and high-volume data fusion are central to their role in defending NATO’s eastern flank.

The Indo-Pacific region presents a different challenge. Here, the decisive terrain is dispersed across archipelagos, with operations shaped by maritime access, air mobility and contested logistics. Heavy cavalry formations are neither agile nor deployable in this environment.

Cavalry units in the Pacific must be lightweight, amphibious-capable and air-deployable via C-130 or rotary-wing lift, emphasizing strategic mobility over armor. LAT-E variants for the Pacific should be optimized for expeditionary reconnaissance, drone coordination and long-range passive sensors. These forces must maneuver across island chains, establish sensor nodes, integrate with joint naval intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms, and support antiship and coastal strike operations. Rather than massed formations, Pacific cavalry must operate as distributed kill-web nodes, conducting rapid reconnaissance in force, terrain denial and integrated fires in support of joint force commanders.

In desert and arid theaters—such as the Middle East and parts of North Africa—the operational imperative centers on endurance, surveillance and wide-area maneuver. Cavalry units here must operate across vast, open terrain under harsh environmental conditions with the ability to persist and protect supply lines in semipermissive or irregular threat environments.

Blend of capabilities

A cavalry tailored to this theater should blend mobility, modular protection and electronic warfare capabilities. LAT-E variants would provide a reconnaissance foundation supported by uncrewed systems and loitering intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets to extend reach without overburdening the force. Key mission sets include persistent overwatch, route security, base defense integration and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance in support of precision strikes. These formations must be sustainment-light and climate-resilient, using hybrid-electric propulsion and modular support packages to maintain operational tempo without a large logistical footprint.

The reconnaissance gap in today’s Army is real—and widening. The dismantling of air/ground cavalry formations, erosion of institutional expertise and overreliance on fragile drone-based systems have left the Army blind in domains where adversaries dominate. From Ukraine to the Red Sea to Taiwan, real-world lessons are clear: reconnaissance cannot be improvised, and situational awareness cannot be delegated to unprotected sensors or algorithmic guesswork.

The Army must act decisively to restore the cavalry’s role in reconnaissance and security operations—not as a relic of the past, but as a critical enabler of multidomain dominance. This means investing in modern, theater-specific cavalry formations tailored to Europe, the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East; integrating manned-unmanned teams and electromagnetic maneuver and rebuilding the culture, doctrine and structure necessary to fight for information.

This is not a call for nostalgia—it is a call for adaptation. Because if we wait until we need the cavalry again, it will be too late.

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Col. Thomas Balish, U.S. Army retired, served 27 years, commanding 3rd Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, from 2000-2002. He retired in 2008 as assistant program manager-Maneuver, U.S. Army Office of the Program Manager-Saudi Arabian National Guard. He then worked for 10 years as an Army civilian. He now is president of LH6-Services LLC.