The combat training center has morphed in purpose and scope since its inception. After the Vietnam War ended in the mid-1970s, the Army created the combat training center to transform its force from a broken service to a highly lethal fighting force, which would be on display during Operation Desert Storm in 1991.

The overwhelming success of Desert Storm could not have happened without the validation of AirLand Battle doctrine, which was tested and refined at multiple combat training center rotations by warfighters in the interwar years.

During the global war on terror, combat training centers took on pre-deployment validation exercises, preparing units for theater-specific scenarios and validating readiness to execute specific missions. 

Today, the U.S. military is in another interwar period and at a critical time in which transformation is essential. Like before, combat training centers will be critical in that transformation. Army leaders must rethink their approach to training centers if they are to transform the Army for the future fight.

Winning Side

“It was challenging, I learned a lot, and the unit and I both walked away from the rotation with some things to work on. Overall, I’d say it was a success. The [combat training center] did what it was intended to do.” After spending more than three years at a combat training center as a member of the opposing force (OPFOR), that was the response I gave to my colleagues upon returning from a combat training center rotation as part of a rotational training unit (RTU). During Saber Junction 23 at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany, I had participated in a combat training center rotation as an RTU member for the first time in years. Having firsthand knowledge of how a combat training center functions allowed me new insights into the training a combat training center can provide.

The combat training center experience is designed to challenge a unit’s capabilities, preparing them for both current and future battlefield environments. However, understanding how to approach a combat training center rotation with the right mindset is critical to success. Here, I will share some of the lessons I learned from being on both sides of a combat training center rotation; as an opposing force member and as part of an RTU. This is by no means an “I did it right” piece, as I made many mistakes. The critical takeaway is not that soldiers make mistakes, but how soldiers learn from those mistakes and, even more importantly, how soldiers implement those lessons learned.

It’s About Mindset

At first glance, winning at a combat training center might seem synonymous with defeating the OPFOR. Many commanders envision standing on a final objective surrounded by an array of OPFOR hulks with amber lights flashing. However, this is a misconception, and for those with this mindset, most combat training center rotations end in disappointment. RTUs usually leave with a hostile mindset toward the OPFOR and observer coach/trainers (OC/T) because the “OPFOR cheated” or “My OC/T got in the way.” The Army must correct this mentality to properly prepare for future conflict.

Why does the OPFOR win so frequently? The answer lies in understanding the role of the OPFOR. The OPFOR’s primary mission is not to defeat the RTU but to provide realistic and challenging training scenarios for the RTU; to simulate the worst day in combat. The mission statement of the Warrior Battalion at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center reads: “Provide realistic joint and combined arms training conditions focused on developing Soldiers, leaders and units for success on current and future battlefields throughout U.S. Army Europe.”

Understanding this helps units understand that the OPFOR is not a consistent opponent that is the same every rotation or even every battle period. It constantly adapts to each training rotation, morphing to meet the specific needs and training objectives of the RTU. The Operations Group commander at a combat training center controls what has been affectionately known as the rheostat. Like the electrical device that controls current flow that it references, the rheostat can be adjusted to increase or decrease the intensity of the environment. If the RTU is performing well, the Operations Group commander can escalate challenges by introducing more aggressive OPFOR tactics, adding new players or even incorporating higher-level assets. Conversely, if the unit is struggling, the Operations Group commander can scale back the challenges, reduce OPFOR combat power and allow the RTU to focus on fundamentals.

Understanding this dynamic is key to success at a combat training center. The OPFOR is not there to beat the RTU, rather it is a tool to create the optimal training environment for units to train at the threshold of failure.

Catalyst for Change

Winning at a combat training center should neither be defined by destruction of the OPFOR, nor by performance of individuals in relation to the scenario, but measured by unit improvement. Many leaders have had their evaluation reports written solely based on their performance at a combat training center. Leaders at the battalion, company and platoon levels tend to be more risk averse if they approach a combat training center rotation as an evaluation and tend to “play it safe” and “only follow the doctrine.”

This does not advance the force nor provide lessons learned for future conflict. This is a holdover of the global war on terror and must be put to rest. Success at a combat training center is about refining systems, improving individual and collective skills and enhancing leadership capabilities at scale. It’s about testing new technologies, capabilities and concepts. Rotations should be the catalyst for change and refinement of standard operating procedures and tactics, techniques and procedures.

The Combat Training Center Directorate defines success as “growing the next generation of adaptive Army leaders and providing relevant land forces for Army Force Generation requirements.” In this context, winning at a combat training center means improving as a unit. To improve the Army, the combat training center must encourage subordinate commanders to take risks, try new concepts and fail falling forward.

A critical part of this improvement is understanding the feedback and lessons provided throughout the rotation. OC/Ts play a pivotal role in providing valuable advice, feedback and perspectives during the combat training center rotation. How well a unit internalizes and acts on this feedback can make the difference between a good rotation and a great one. The real measure of success is the unit’s ability to recognize its weaknesses, address them and develop a mindset of continuous improvement, both during and after the rotation.

Preparing for Success

A successful combat training center rotation requires an understanding of the environment, avoiding common pitfalls and embracing the complexities of large-scale combat operations. Factors such as weather, limited resupply and sleep deprivation all contribute to an RTU’s leadership challenges. It’s easy for units to fixate on the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System, OC/T interference, what the OPFOR is doing or how safety measures limit realism. This is white noise, the distractions good leaders and good units overcome to maximize learning at a combat training center. Maintaining focus on improvement and adaptability will determine whether the unit succeeds.

Transforming in Contact

A key challenge in modern military training is preparing for today’s fight while remaining ready for the future. This is where the Army’s Transforming in Contact 2.0 initiative becomes crucial. Transforming in Contact 2.0 emphasizes the need for units to remain flexible, agile and ready to adapt during combat, and learning from every engagement to continuously improve. Combat training centers test a unit’s ability to transform in contact.

The fluid and unpredictable nature of the training environment mirrors the chaos of real-world combat. A unit’s ability to respond to new and evolving challenges is critical, as is its ability to improve tactics, strategies and implementation of new technologies as training progresses. The Army must leverage combat training center rotations to be new concept and technology test beds, rather than evaluations of leaders’ expertise against current doctrine.

Units going through transformation must be encouraged to take risks, try new tactics and employ new equipment. Therefore, success should not be measured by performance at a combat training center or the effect on the OPFOR, but on what a unit can provide back to the Army in refined tactics, techniques and procedures and lessons learned.

The converse of this also is critical. OC/Ts cannot solely rely on doctrine as a unit’s evaluation standard. New technologies, an advancing operational environment or enemy tactics, techniques and procedures may render old doctrines obsolete or rapidly outdated.

Combat training centers must be at the cutting edge of the latest technology, the OPFOR must be tied in with the latest enemy doctrines, and evaluations need to be based on current threat replication, rather than outdated training and evaluation outlines.

Venues like The Harding Project allow units to share these lessons learned with the entire force. Units, as well as the combat training centers, should provide feedback to the force about what worked and didn’t work each rotation to adapt the force accordingly.

Winning at a combat training center is not about beating the OPFOR but about improving the RTU’s capabilities, leadership and systems. Success is measured by the unit’s ability to learn, adapt and grow during the training rotation.

The Army’s focus on transformation is essential in preparing units to balance readiness for both the current and future fight. Combat training centers will again be a cornerstone in paving the way as the Army transforms. By approaching a combat training center with the right mindset, units can achieve lasting success that will serve them well on future battlefields.

Capt. Jacob Jacke, Maj. Mike Nilsen, Capt. Benjamin Pimentel and Capt. Donald Wright contributed to this article.

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Maj. Dan Dipzinski is the operations officer for the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center, Fort Shafter, Hawaii. Previously, he was operations officer for 3rd Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, Vilseck, Germany. He deployed to Afghanistan. He has two master’s degrees: one in public administration from Columbus State University in Georgia, and the other in military science from Marine Corps University.