Protection in the Indo-Pacific is equivalent to possessing a boxer’s on-guard stance. Metaphorically, America’s I Corps aspires to see, sense and understand the adversary like a boxer preparing to enter an arena. When the boxer enters the ring, they must be able to see over and “through” their gloves, possessing an on-guard stance that is synchronized, integrated and not separated from the ability to fire, maneuver and think.

I Corps can deliver and survive any number of punching combinations. The opponent knows the corps can deliver a knockout blow with the first salvo and will think twice before making a move. I Corps’ on-guard stance is sustained in between rounds, and golden hour medical treatment is within reach.

Pushing Forward

U.S. Army Pacific commander Gen. Charles Flynn provided a valuable perspective on what the Army must do to support U.S. national interests in the Indo-Pacific region during a Sept. 8 discussion at the Hudson Institute, “Gaining Ground in the Pacific: The U.S. Army’s Role in Campaigning to Deter China.” Flynn argued that the joint force must place command and control, sustainment, collection and protection capabilities forward of the international date line. In essence, our military must carve out interior lines, which allow commanders to move quickly against enemy forces along shorter lines of operation, by placing the right capabilities at the right time for the right reasons to compete with adversaries in the region.

Carving out interior lines in the Indo-Pacific is a huge task for the Army, let alone the joint force, but it is not impossible. Experts within each of the Army’s seven warfighting functions must develop a synchronized approach that gains and sustains combat credibility by fully integrating fires, intelligence, information and maneuver with command and control, sustainment and protection. Arguably, the first aspect to that approach must be to strengthen the on-guard stance of the Army’s only three-star operational headquarters in the region, I Corps.

I Corps’ experience at exercise Talisman Sabre 23 in Australia in July and August, where it employed all warfighting functions and the corps’ Distributed Command and Control Node network west of the international date line, provided leaders insight into how the corps might strengthen its protective stance. Specifically, this experience provided leaders from the protection warfighting function with the opportunity to describe a vision for I Corps’ approach, identify four principles for fighting protection and share recommendations with Army senior leaders who might adopt these ideas to enhance our on-guard stance in the Pacific.

Four Principles

Coming out of the Talisman Sabre 23 experience, the corps defined four protection fighting principles that are relevant to any leader who is in the fight, heading to the fight or assisting in the fight. Protection fighting means that protection professionals lead from the front and maneuver with combat arms by moving to points of friction, with the goal of placing the Army in a position of advantage to dominate the situation and our adversaries. The principles are:

1. Understand the environment.

2. Know the plan, know the decisions and have a bias for action.

3. Leaders achieve multidomain protection effects by bringing protection programs to life through the battle rhythm and operations cycle.

4. Army protection programs and the protection warfighting function are inseparable activities that leaders must execute concurrently from fort to port to fighting position.

Beginning with understanding the environment, leaders know I Corps must campaign across vast distances in an archipelagic setting where the battlefield geometry offers asymmetric advantages to forces in position and ready to fight. Corps leadership also knows rear-area operations will occur within the littorals, reliant upon multiple lines of communication and exterior lines of operation. Reducing risk to mission requires interior lines of communication, protected logistics and precision resupply dependent on the strategic support area that extends from Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, where I Corps is headquartered.

Bias for Action

Understanding the environment leads to the second principle requiring leaders to know the plan, know the decisions and have a bias for action. This means the corps fights protection from a command-centric view that focuses planning efforts on key command decisions throughout the operations process. Planners stay focused on key command decision points while refining the concept of protection with a bias for action using the I Corps’ DARES problem-solving framework to meet the commander’s intent. DARES stands for Defining our fights, Apportioning efforts, Resourcing our priorities, assessing Effects and Seeking feedback. Fighting protection from a command-centric approach and employing the DARES framework preserves combat effectiveness, enhances survivability and enables the commander to fight free.

The third fighting principle emphasizes the importance of executing operations that are integrated and synchronized across domains with each of the warfighting functions. To achieve protection effects, planners must align protection activities to the commander’s priorities and nest protection with the commander’s scheme of maneuver.

The corps’ method to operationalize protection systems with other warfighting functions is through the I Corps Protection Decision Board that synchronizes the human, procedural and technical expertise of subject-matter experts. By operationalizing protection at the decision board, commanders converge protection during critical operations on the battlefield, overcoming challenges inherent in a competitive ecosystem of people, programs, processes and technology.

Recognizing that Army protection programs and the protection warfighting function are inseparable activities executed concurrently from fort to port to fighting position is as much a principle as it is a mindset. The fourth principle is informed by the fact that I Corps answers to both U.S. Army Pacific and the U.S. Army Forces Command, and is accountable to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and the U.S. Northern Command. This principle assumes the homeland is no longer a sanctuary, which means I Corps does not separate institutional protection programs that predominantly reside in the strategic support area from protection operations that occur west of the international date line.

Furthermore, it means I Corps’ command and staff, in conjunction with Lewis-McChord’s Joint Base Garrison, must actively fight protection to support warfighting abroad. This is done by shoring up vulnerabilities at home to preserve capability and readiness across the range of military operations.

Principle to Practice

Moving from principle to practice, the following observations and recommendations could help strengthen protection in the Indo-Pacific and enhance the joint force’s on-guard stance.

The corps and division rear area fight is a joint fight and is the most complex operation the corps might experience in large-scale combat, since all domains persistently converge in this space. Conceivably, tactical and operational friction could lead to joint force isolation, creating strategic and political problems. Friction in the rear could place warfighters against the ropes, limiting options for political and strategic leaders.

To overcome problems in the corps rear area, the joint force should organize the protection staff around doctrinal principles and establish a standing Joint Security Coordination Center. Centralizing protection decisions during campaigning would help resource protection priorities inside the first island chain, strengthening our on-guard stance. The first island chain refers generally to the chain of islands including Japan, Taiwan, Indonesia and parts of the Philippines.

Going a step further, U.S. Indo Pacific Command should appoint a joint security coordinator with U.S. Army Pacific and I Corps, selecting one of its commanders as the protection coordinator. Designating a commander as the protection coordinator provides the protection warfighting function with command authority vice staff coordinating authority. Much like the multipurpose role of the corps fires brigade commander, the protection coordinator could best synchronize efforts and bring all resources to bear.

A practical example of where this type of approach is important might be the protection coordinator’s command authority over afloat Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense systems placed on Army watercraft that are dual-purposed to provide precision resupply while protecting the rear area. A military police, engineer or air defense brigade commander could fill this role.

The second observation made during Talisman Sabre is that Army protection force structure is inadequate for Operation Pathways and is not aligned to support I Corps distributed command and control. For example, there are no U.S. Army Reserve or National Guard maneuver enhancement brigade capabilities assigned to fiscal 2023 or 2024 exercises that are meant to support protection operations such as command and control and terrain management of the corps’ rear area.

To overcome protection gaps, Army senior leaders should make maneuver enhancement brigade employment in the Pacific an enduring requirement to support U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s strategy of integrated deterrence and enhance U.S. Army Pacific’s combat credibility within the first island chain.

Protection Options

The joint force and Army headquarters could look at the size and orientation of protection staffs across echelons. Distributing or apportioning personnel and programs that are resourced, such as the Army’s anti-terrorism and force protection programs, to the corps could enable operational protection for corps, division and brigades. If distributing resources from U.S. Indo-Pacific Command or U.S. Army Pacific staffs to the corps is not an option, Army headquarters could enable corps protection with an organic and deployable team of anti-terrorism/force protection assessment professionals to support campaign initiatives and help the corps with Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement site development.

Carving out interior lines through campaigning requires the joint force to develop an operational approach that is credible in the eyes of our partners, allies and adversaries. Implementing I Corps’ fighting principles and recommendations is the first step in strengthening the U.S. Army’s on-guard stance. Placing command and control, collection, sustainment and protection in the region at the same time or before the joint force places maneuver and fires inside the first island chain is similar to the actions a professional boxer and their coach might make.

Likewise, the Army must lead with an on-guard stance that is prioritized and resourced in the Pacific. Doing so improves our odds of surviving and winning the first fight—where winning matters.

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Col. Scott Blanchard is the provost marshal and chief of protection for I Corps, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington. Previously, he was the military adviser to the Afghan chief of general staff, and before that, he was battalion commander for the 91st Military Police Battalion, Fort Drum, New York. He has deployed to Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo. He has two master’s degrees, one in kinesiology from Texas A&M University and one in strategic studies from the U.S. Army War College.